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ABSTRACT 
Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent 
upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such 
as MIL-HDBK-217F.  Reliability prediction 
methodologies based on component data do not take into 
account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, 
and process controls. These sources often dominate 
component level reliability or risk of failure probability.  
 
While consequences of failure is often understood in 
assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to 
estimate the probability of occurrence will likely 
underestimate the risk.  Managers and decision makers 
often use the probability of occurrence in determining 
whether to accept the risk or require a design 
modification.  Due to the absence of system level test 
and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, 
the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be 
appropriately characterized for decision making 
purposes. This paper will establish a method and 
approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of 
accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. 
This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may 
be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of 
risk prior to acceptance by a program.  
INTRODUCTION 
In today’s environment, cost, schedule, and safety risk 
are paramount in the aerospace industry. Many 
companies and government agencies are allowing 
predicted reliability data to be used to determine if a 
component, assembly, system, and ultimately the vehicle, 
meet safety requirements. Typically, Safety engineers 
use subjective methods or they may use quantitative 
methods to assess the likelihood of a specific failure 
scenarios occurrence.  Quantifying the risks would be the 
first choice in assessing risk; however, some programs 
allow the use of predicted failure data to quantify the risk 
accomplished by the modeling of failure scenarios.  
Failure data typically come from MIL-HDBK-217F, 
which is outdated and has been discontinued by the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  The values are generally 
overly optimistic, as can be seen by comparison with 
demonstrated data.  These values are adjusted for the 
specific failure mode distributions that causes a specific 
failure event. These values often misrepresent the actual 
risk when managers are considering accepting or 
rejecting the risk.  In either case, the cost of redesign or 
loss of the asset may represent a significant failure for 
the program.  This paper will examine the differences in 
using predicted vs. demonstrated data methods.  One 
method uses epistemic error factors, and the other uses 
calculated error factors per the formulation found in 
SAPHIRE version 8 [2].  Examining these differences 
will identify the pitfalls and demonstrate the need for 
precautions. 
In addition, testing which is used to validate the product 
is also being reduced to realize even further cost and 
schedule savings, often at the expense of reliability and 
safety.  Decreased electrical, electronic, and electro-
mechanical (EEE) parts grades have also been allowed in 
certain instances.  In other areas, it has been proposed to 
reduce thermal cycling, burn in, and thermal vacuum 
testing to provide even further cost and schedule 
reduction. These measures may actually increase the risk 
of failure by not knowing if the reliability has been met 
as well as allowing infant mortality failures to occur 
while on the launch pad. Unidentified latent failures that 
are undetected due to reduced testing may manifest 
during flight. All of these issues may very well increase 
the overall risk to a point that the true risk is unknown, 
especially when predicted values are used in modeling 
the risk, and uncertainty surrounding the model is now in 
question. 
Precautions should be made aware when using predicted 
data to assess safety risks due to pitfalls of unidentified 
or incorrectly identified failure data and associated 
uncertainty. Predicted data does not take into account 
manufacturing, assembly, and operational processes.  
When quantifying risk, the actual risk reported and used 
in the decision making process may misrepresent both 
the outcome and associated uncertainty. 
The predicted and demonstrated data models utilize 
epistemic and aleatory error factors (EF), which 
represent the uncertainty in each model..  A lognormal 
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distribution is assumed for both models and the resulting 
mean risk and system uncertainties are then compared.   
1  ESTIMATING FAILURE RATES 
1.1 MIL-HDBK-217F 
This approach quantifies failure rates at the component 
level, which is modified, based on a component’s, 
environment, temperature range, and quality. When used 
in similar environments, the differences between system 
applications may be significant.  Correct application by 
the user is a limitation of the prediction method. 
The example model below demonstrates the effect of 
predicted reliability data. 
The Model basis: MIL-HDBK-217F [5] stress method, 
environment is Airborne Uninhabited Fighter (AUF). 
Quality factors are those of the highest level for the 
specific part analyzed.  Temperatures, where applicable, 
are baselined at 130 deg. C, stress loads, where 
applicable, are between 90 and 100%. Devices are 
procured with normal manufacturer’s screening 
consisting of temperature cycling, constant acceleration, 
electrical testing, seal test, and external visual inspection. 
It is assumed that the component manufacturer also 
performs all screens and tests to the applicable MIL-PRF 
[6] or equivalent MIL-STD-883 screening method.  
Component types modeled are CMOS digital gate arrays, 
low frequency diodes, bipolar transistors, resistors and 
capacitors.   
The applicable adjustment factors for the prediction 
model components may be found in MIL-HDBK-217F 
[5]  
The predicted failure rates and MTTF for each 
component is shown in Table 1 
MIL-HDBK-217F Failure Rates 
Component Failure 
Rate 
MTTF 
Digital Gate Array 2.47e-8 40.485,830 
Diode (LF) 4.25e-7 2,350,012 
Transistor 3.53e-7 2,829,562 
Resistors (RCR) 1.42e-7 7,058,767 
Capacitors (CCR) 1.37e-8 72,878,861 
Table 1. 
A representative system fault tree was built using 
SAPHIRE 8 for predicted values as is seen in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
Predicted Value Fault Tree 
An epistemic error factor value of 8 was selected for all 
components, which were taken from the Data Source 
Classification Application [1], as seen in Table 2. 
Error Factor Data Source Classification Approach[1] 
Data Source Classification Approach 
Source  
Source 
Description 
Source 
Application 
Error 
Factor 
New 
Hardware 
MIL-HDBK-217F 
Same 
Component 
8 
Like Component 9 
Table 2. 
 
 
1.2 Demonstrated Failure Rates 
This approach quantifies failure rates by using same 
components taken from the Quanterion Automated 
Databook using EPRD-2014, NPRD-2016, and where 
applicable FMD-2016 [3].  The same components used 
in the predicted model are selected where several years 
of failure data was found. Adjustments for varying 
environments were adjusted to the AUF environment by 
using MIL-HDBK-338 [4]. The mean values and 
standard deviations were calculated.  The Error Factors 
were calculated using Eq.1. [2]. 
𝐸𝐹 = 𝑒1.645√ln⁡(1 + (𝜎𝑙𝑛 𝜇𝑙𝑛)⁄
2
)                (1) 
SAPHIRE 8 Error Factor Calculation 
The demonstrated failure rates and MTTF for each 
component are shown in Table 3. 
Demonstrated Failure Rates 
Component Failure 
Rate 
MTTF 
Digital Gate Array 2.93e-6 341,491 
Diode (LF) 2.49e-6 400,267 
Transistor 9.38e-7 1,065,719 
Resistors (RCR) 2.77e-6 360,577 
Capacitors (CRH) 1.06e-6 934,798 
Table 3. 
A representative system fault tree was built using 
SAPHIRE 8 for demonstrated values is seen in Figure 4 
 
Figure 4 
Demonstrated Value Fault Tree 
Demonstrated lognormal uncertainty (EF) was calculated 
using Eq. 1. The values in Table 4, were applied to their 
respective components. 
Demonstrated Error Factors 
Component Error factor 
Digital Gate Array 4.61 
Diode (LF) 4.1 
Transistor 4.09 
Resistors (RCR) 4.67 
Capacitors (CCR) 3.91 
Table 4 
 
1.3 Model Parameters 
Both models were constructed in the same fashion.  
Model logic was based on two parallel strings requiring a 
two of two output logic to achieve functional output.  
Each strings components are in serial with a single 
failure causing a loss of function for that string.  The 
mission time is one quarter of an hour.  All components 
were correlated to each individual type.  Fifty thousand 
Monte Carlo trials were ran with identical seed values. 
1.4 System Uncertainty Calculations 
The system level uncertainty for each model type was 
then computed based upon the method in Figure 5 [1].  .  
Quantitatively, the error factor represents the spread of 
the lognormal distribution about the median.  The Error 
Factor is represented as the 95th divided by the median 
[1]. System uncertainty for each model type is based on 
this method.  
 
 
Figure 5. 
Lognormal Probability Density Function 
2 Results 
The two models were then solved in SAPHIRE 8 by 
performing Monte Carlo trials, the results of which were 
used to calculate the system level uncertainty.  The end 
results were then compared with the results as shown in 
Table 5. 
Predicted vs. Demonstrated results 
Model Type Risk (1/N) Uncertainty 
Predicted 1/2,111,041 4.08 
Demonstrated 1/196,657 2.3 
   
Table 5. 
3  CONCLUSION 
As one can see, the results in Table 5 are vastly different.  
The risk value is 11 times less for the predicted model.  
If used for a quantitative assessment when considering 
the risk in a decision scenario, the risk may be 
misrepresented.  In the case of uncertainty, the dispersion 
of the risk is two times greater in the predicted model.  
This indicates that demonstrated data lowers uncertainty 
and predicted uncertainty range may necessitate further 
effort to collect additional data. 
This difference gives rise to identify the pitfalls and 
precautions when developing quantitative models, which 
are used to assess and accept risk.   
3.1  Pitfalls 
The pitfalls one may experience are: 
 Predicted failure data are overly optimistic. 
 Predicted failure data does not take into account 
manufacturing, assembly and quality process 
controls, which are primary failure drivers. 
 Predicted failure data may mislead managers 
into accepting a level of risk that is not 
commensurate with the actual risk. 
 Predicted data should not be used to assess 
system reliability against reliability 
requirements. 
3.2  Precautions 
Precautions when using predicted failure data. 
 If a concerted effort to obtain realistic data is 
not done, the resulting risk model may not be 
valid. 
 Failure databases are difficult to locate and may 
be more difficult to obtain permission to access. 
 Equal quality components must be used in 
developing risk models. 
 Evaluate and adjust environments, if necessary. 
 The source of data must be documented for 
traceability. 
Obtaining valid data to perform risk modeling requires 
an understanding of the nature of the problems in 
obtaining and analyzing data to be used in modeling a 
system or in performing a system analysis to determine if 
the risk of a particular failure scenario is worth 
accepting, or if a redesign or system modification is 
warranted. 
4 Summary 
System design is constrained by Safety, Reliability, and 
Quality requirements as well as design standards. The 
purpose being to assure safety, which is generally related 
to quality of product, design, and testing.  
These bounds are where the risks lie, and must be fully 
recognized, understood, minimized, and eventually 
accepted or redesigned to a level, which then meets 
acceptable risk. 
As programs and projects proceed, risks are accepted at 
these bounds. The bounds over time become eroded by 
the acceptance of risk, and at some time, the aggregate 
risks may well exceed these bounds.  This may result in a 
falsely perceived level of confidence, and allow a project 
to proceed to a state of potential disaster, which may 
result in a loss of life and physical property. 
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